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Abstract
The thesis examines the protection of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) rights in the European Union (EU). After accession to the EU, one of the 
EU’s most powerful weapons for ensuring adaption into the EU norms and rules - 
conditionality  - is lost. In some EU Member States, the EU norm of non-
discrimination against sexual minorities has not yet been successfully adopted. 
Using Europeanisation theory as a theoretical framework, the thesis aims at 
examining what tools the EU have at its disposal to ensure that the norm of non-
discrimination against sexual minorities is adopted in all its Member States. More 
specifically, in the absence of external incentives, does the EU use mechanisms of 
social learning? The study  conclude that the EU do use social learning, along with 
other mechanisms, but could benefit from having a strategic framework for 
LGBT issues within the Union.
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2List of Abbreviations
Amsterdam Treaty  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of 
 the European Union, the Treaties establishing
 the European Communities and certain related
 acts
CEE countries Central and Eastern European countries
Commission European Commission
Council Council of the European Union
ECJ Court of Justice of the European Union
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and
 Human Rights
EU European Union
EU Charter Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
 European Union (2010/C 83/02)
FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental
 Rights
Horizontal Directive Proposal for a Council Directive on 
 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
 between persons irrespective of religion or 
 belief, disability, age or sexual orientation 
 (COM (2008) 426 final)
ILGA-Europe European Region of the International Lesbian, 
 Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association
Lisbon Treaty Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on 
 European Union and the Treaty on the 
 European Community
LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
MEP Member of the European Parliament
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
TEU (Consolidated Version of) the Treaty on 
 European Union
TFEU (Consolidated Version of) the Treaty on the 
 Functioning of the European Union
Toolkit Toolkit to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment
 of all Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, 
 Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) People
31 Introduction
According to the EU Treaty  (Treaty on European Union, TEU), the European 
Union (EU or hereinafter Union) is 
founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. The values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination,  tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail. 
(Article 2 TEU). 
With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s legal obligations to human rights was further 
strengthened by making the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights legally binding 
for the Member States. In the past two decades the EU has significantly stepped 
up its work for the rights of sexual minorities in the Union and there is a 
pronounced norm of equal rights for all, regardless of sexual orientation. In a 
number of eastern Member States however (for example Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania), this part  of the human rights acquis is still facing opposition. In many 
of these countries, the issue of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
rights did not  appear on the political agenda until pressure was applied by the EU 
during the accession negotiations (O’Dwyer 2010: 230). During the accession 
period, the EU had a strong influence on the candidate states. The Copenhagen 
Criteria put high pressure on the states to reform their political systems, not least 
with regards to human rights and minority protection. The recent years’ disturbing 
trend in a number of Member States, with increased discrimination and 
vulnerability of sexual minorities, raises concerns regarding the sustained post-
accession compliance of the EU human rights acquis, not least within culturally 
sensitive policy areas. When the EU no longer have the strong enforcement 
mechanisms of conditionality, can it ensure compliance with its norms regarding 
sexual minorities?
1.1 Purpose and Research Question
If the EU is to continue to be a credible normative actor within the international 
human rights regime, it needs to be able to ensure a strong protection for the 
human rights within the Union. Even though the sanctions available to EU 
institutions to punish infringements of EU law are less powerful than the threat of 
4withholding membership to a candidate state, they are still much more powerful 
than the leverage of EU institutions with regards to the political conditions for 
accession, such as human rights and minority protection (Sedelmeier 2011: 27). 
International human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, has 
raised critique against the EU, claiming that much work remains for the EU in 
enforcing its human rights standards in the Member States. Among the key  human 
rights abuses are, according to the organisation, the widespread discrimination of 
LGBT people (Amnesty International 2013). The overarching purpose of this 
thesis is to examine in what  ways the EU can further the diffusion of “EU-
specific” norms to its new Member States. More specifically, the thesis aims at 
investigating how the rights of LGBT people in the EU can be enhanced, 
especially in the new Member States. From this purpose, the following research 
questions are posed:
In the absence of external incentives such as EU membership – how does the 
EU work to ensure that the norm of non-discrimination towards sexual 
minorities is internalised in the Member states?
What tools does the EU have at its disposal? What concrete measures are 
being taken?
The research question is of principled importance, because it  is essential that the 
EU has functioning mechanisms to ensure that the founding principles and norms 
are obeyed and are successfully diffused into the new Member States after they 
accede to the Union. Human rights is a fundamental principle for the EU and 
plays a large role as a common identity  for the Member States. If the Union fails 
in upholding the respect for human rights in all its Member States, it would thus 
affect the common identity. LGBT rights are sensitive issues and thereby 
interesting to examine, as one would expect to find greater resistance to the new 
norms in this policy area. Should one find a functioning model in this area, that 
model should be applicable on other areas as well. 
1.2 Disposition
I start  by outlining the theoretical framework of the thesis. In order to 
communicate how the theories on socialisation positions themselves in the wider 
Europeanisation research, I start by a brief introduction to Europeanisation theory. 
I then move on to the functioning of the norm diffusion process, to provide the 
necessary  background to the theories of external incentives and social learning. 
The focus in this paper is on social learning, however the context of external 
incentives (and the problems associated with it in the post-accession period) is 
needed. In chapter 3, I outline the normative foundation of the EU, how norms 
and ideas are a central part to the EU identity, before moving on to argue for there 
being a strong norm on non-discrimination for sexual minorities. The following 
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States. Chapter 4 analyses what mechanisms the EU has at its disposal for coming 
to terms with this problem, in the light of social learning theory. The thesis ends 
with a concluding discussion. 
1.3 Method and Material
I apply a social constructivist approach to my  study. Social constructivism is a 
theoretical approach to international relations based on the premise that “the 
interest and identities of political actors, including states, are socially  constructed 
(Jordan 2003:664).  It stresses the importance of political cooperation, and not 
merely a strictly legal regulation within the EU. Creating common institutions 
facilitates the finding of common solutions to problems. Unlike realists, who see 
international organisations as merely the tools of states, scholars of social 
constructivism see these organisations and institutions as independent actors (Ibid: 
664ff). My focus is on the norms of the EU, not merely the legislation of the 
Union. I take the concepts from socialisation theory and apply them to the 
mechanisms I identify in the EU’s work on LGBT rights. To a certain degree the 
study has a normative approach, as I argue that the EU must protect its norms on 
sexual minorities, and that it is of great importance that all Member States adhere 
to the norms. The study is qualitative as I to a large extent  look at primary sources 
of EU law and policies, to determine what kind of socialisation mechanisms the 
applies. 
The study at hand constitutes a case of socialisation of new Member States 
into a specific “EU culture”. By  examining what tools the EU have at  its disposal 
to ensure that the Member States are acting in accordance with the norms of 
LGBT equality and non-discrimination, an indication is given to how well the 
new Member States have been socialised into the EU culture of respect for human 
rights, and more specifically, minority rights. Respect for sexual minorities is 
suitable as a case study of post-accession Europeanisation, as the issue did not 
become politicised until after accession. It  is also a policy area where culturally 
sensitive norms conflict  with each other. If a strategy can be found for successful 
socialisation in this policy area, it is likely to be successful also in other areas.
I make qualitative document studies to demonstrate that there is a norm of 
LGBT equality  in the EU, and that there is a discrepancy between this norm and 
the practice in some Member States. As there is no coherent EU policy on LGBT 
rights, I illustrate this norm by analysing different legislative acts, as well as 
political statements and policies. In chapter 2, I provide an analytical framework 
for Europeanisation and norm diffusion, and show how the theories on external 
incentives and social learning fit into this. Some parts of the model is not 
applicable to this analysis, however. The third stage of the norm “life cycle”, 
internalisation, will not be measured in this analysis. In order to measure 
internalisation, or implementation of the norm, empirical research would have to 
be made “on the ground” in selected Member States, in order to fully determine 
6whether the norm has been internalised. This is not the purpose of this study. 
Rather, I am interested in how the EU acts when its Member States are not acting 
in accordance with a certain norm, in this case LGBT equality. 
1.4 Delimitations
The thesis is not primarily  aimed at  mapping the overall discrimination against 
sexual minorities in some Member States. Today, there is no general non-
discrimination legislation in the EU covering sexual orientation, beyond the area 
of employment. In many  member states there is no legislation protecting sexual 
minorities from inter alia hate speech. As there is less legislation, there is less 
opportunity for the Commission to act on infringement procedures. A closer look 
on adaption to the EU culture, or EU norms, may therefore be more productive.
My focus is not to analyse why LGBT rights seems to be a particularly 
difficult area  to socialise the norms. I am interested in the process in which norms 
are socialised and internalised by  the Member States. Mainly, my focus lies in 
how the EU works to diffuse this norm to the Member States. Further, I will not 
be analysing to what extent the EU is effective in socialising its Member States, as 
that would be beyond the scope of this study.
 On many policy areas there has been good progress in adapting to the EU 
norms, and EU conditionality has in many cases led to a behavioural change in the 
new member states. The reasons for why this seems to be harder for some states in 
the area of sexual rights is an interesting question, and one that deserves further 
research. It is however a question that is beyond the scope of this paper. Many 
factors could be included in such an analysis: the normative context of the country 
in question; its cultural, religious and historical legacies; and the role of civil 
society agents are a few examples. The purpose of this paper, however, is to look 
at how the EU acts when norms are not being adopted successfully, and not to 
look into the specific reasons for why certain norms are not adopted. 
Discrimination in the wider social sphere is a complex phenomenon, and is 
too wide a scope for this study. To alter the perception and opinions of a society as 
a whole is a complex process that  takes time. It may also be hard to determine to 
what extent the ruling elites can be held responsible for this. However, when it 
comes to open discrimination and offending language in public spheres such as 
the media, official agencies, public statements and in public or or educational 
sector, there is a clear responsibility of the state to make sure that there are 
policies that are in line with the EU norms - and that they  are upheld. As 
mentioned above, to measure to what extent a norm has been internalised would 
require an empirical study on the ground in the respective states. For that  reason, I 
will not be looking at the real effects of the EU socialisation process. 
My point of departure is, however, that when public officials and leading 
politicians, i.e. representatives of the state, are using a direct homophobic rhetoric, 
and putting forward homophobic legislation, one cannot argue that the norm has 
been internalised. In this situation - how does the EU act? 
72 Theoretical Framework
In this chapter the theoretical framework guiding the paper will be outlined. The 
study places itself within the larger context of Europeanisation, more specifically 
how the EU socialises its Member States into internalising EU norms on non-
discrimination of sexual minorities. First, I present the previous research done in 
the field of Europeanisation and norm diffusion. I then move on to outline the 
main theories used in this study: the external incentives model and social learning. 
As the focus of this study is on the post-accession period, the primary  theory 
guiding the analysis is social learning, but an understanding of the external 
incentives model is necessary, as it is a central component in the EU’s work to 
socialise its member states prior to accession. 
2.1 Europeanisation
This study positions itself within the field of Europeanisation research. The term 
”Europeanisation” can be found in a wide spectrum of studies, covering issues 
such as: How does Europeanisation affect the interests and ideas, actors and 
institutions within the European union? What is the impact of the EU on policy 
processes? How have interest groups responded to the new form of EU politics? 
(Featherstone 2003: 20). One of the main critiques against  Europeanisation as an 
analytical framework is that researchers often use the term without giving it a 
precise definition. As Kevin Featherstone notes, “the faddish use of 
‘Europeanisation’ in different contexts can easily obscure its substantive 
meaning” (Ibid: 3). Moreover, concepts that are not well-defined lead to 
confusion, and concepts without negation are universals - they point to everything 
(Radaelli 2003: 28). However, Featherstone argues, “precisely  the breadth of 
application and the demanding explanatory framework needed, attests to the value 
and importance of the term” (Featherstone 2003: 19). The term provides a 
gateway to understanding the complex web of developments that characterises the 
politics of the EU today.
In order to avoid the critique that the scope of Europeanisation is too wide to 
be used as a research agenda, it is important to specify what is meant  by 
“Europeanisation”. In his overview over Europeanisation research, Featherstone 
argues that the term can have a wider usage than just issues concerning the EU, 
such as increasing transnationalism, where ideas and norms spread across Europe. 
However, today the term is most associated with domestic adaptation to the 
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term “EU-isation” could be used) (Featherstone 2003: 7f; Radaelli 2003: 27).
One early definition of the term, that  has been widely used, is that of Ladrech, 
who sees it as “a process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part  of the organisational 
logic of national politics and policy-making” (Featherstone 2003: 12). Claudio 
Radaelli (2003:30) specifies the definition further to include mechanisms and 
effects of socialisation, stating that Europeanisation refers to
processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) 
discourse, political structures, and public policies.
In other words, actors redefine their their interests and behaviour to meet the 
imperatives, norms, and logic of EU membership. 
2.1.1 On Norms and Norm Diffusion
Before going into the specifics of the norm diffusion process, a brief 
conceptualisation of what I mean by “norms” are in order. In the social 
constructivist literature, definitions of norms are often based on behaviour, 
prescription, and shared expectations. Norms represent standards of behaviour 
that often result from common practices, but who also have proscriptive or 
prescriptive qualities: they deem what is considered appropriate. As Annika 
Björkdahl argues: “[f]or the normal to become normative, a feeling of obligation 
needs to be added, and the behaviour must be driven by norms” (Björkdahl 2002: 
40). This prescriptive quality is precisely what sets norms apart from “rules”. A 
third element common to the conceptualisation of norms is shared collective 
expectations. In a given context, actors with a certain identity are expected to 
behave in a certain way (in accordance with the norm) (Finnemore & Sikkink 
1998: 891f; Björkdahl 2002: 43)
  In the norm diffusion process, two separate logics of action can be discerned 
to explain the reason behind actors’ behaviour.  Actions can be seen as driven by a 
logic of consequence, where the anticipated consequences of the action and the 
prior preferences of the actor determines actor behaviour. The actor thus makes a 
rational calculation of what consequence a certain action will result in (March & 
Olsen 1998: 950). 
Within the logic of appropriateness, actions are seen as rule-based. An actor 
with a given identity, is expected to respond to a specific situation according to 
certain rules. As March and Olsen explains, “[t]he pursuit of purpose is associated 
with identities more than with interests, and with the selection of rules more than 
with rational expectations” (Ibid: 951).
Thus, in the present case, if a state, or state actor, is driven by a logic of 
appropriateness, it adheres to a norm because it is convinced of the merits of the 
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because it believes that there is something to be gained from doing so, and not 
necessarily because it believes in the merits of the norm.
The two logics places themselves under different theoretical approaches: the 
sociological institutionalist versus the rationalist institutionalist (Featherstone 
2003: 15f). However, as both Featherstone and March & Olsen points out, the two 
logics are not incompatible. Rather, as we shall see, the two logics often occur 
simultaneously  or  they  characterise different phases of the Europeanisation 
process. The impact of Europeanisation is also differential across policies, 
polities, and politics, which is why  different explanations for action and different 
basis for institutional change may be required (Featherstone 2003: 16; March & 
Olsen 1998: 953f). 
2.1.2 The Norm “Life Cycle”
In their work on international norm dynamics, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink highlight three aspects of norms - their origins, the mechanisms by which 
they  exercise influence, and under which conditions norms will be influential in 
international politics.  Their argument is that norms evolve in a certain pattern 
they  describe as the norm’s “life cycle” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 888). The 
“life cycle” consists of three stages - norm emergence, norm cascade and 
internalisation. At each stage, different social processes and logics of action may 
be involved. Norm-driven change may thus be characterised by different actors, 
motives, and mechanisms of influence (see table 1), depending on what stage in 
the norm’s evolution one is looking at (Ibid: 895).
Table 1. Stages of norms
Stage 1
Norm emergence
Stage 2
Norm cascade
Stage 3
Internalisation
Actors Norm entrepreneurs 
with organisational 
platforms
States, international 
organisations, 
networks
Law, professions, 
bureaucracy
Motives Altruism, empathy, 
ideational 
commitment
Legitimacy, 
reputation, esteem
Conformity
Dominant 
mechanisms
Persuasion Socialisation, 
institutionalisation, 
demonstration
Habit, 
institutionalisation
(Table taken from Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 898)
In the first stage, norm emergence, the characteristic mechanism is is persuasion 
by norm entrepreneurs, who tries to convince a critical mass of states to adopt a 
new norm. The motivations of norm entrepreneurs may  vary, but according to 
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Finnemore & Sikkink, they are usually either altruism, empathy or ideational 
commitment (when a norm is promoted because the entrepreneur believes in the 
ideals and values embodied in the norm). Common for these motives are that they 
all relate to the identity of the norm entrepreneur, and thus are guided by a logic of 
appropriateness (Ibid: 895, 898). In the second stage, norm cascade, norm leaders 
attempt to socialise other states to become norm followers. The main motivations 
for embracing the new norm in this stage are a combination of “pressure for 
conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state 
leaders to enhance their self-esteem” (Ibid: 895, 898). When a critical mass of 
relevant state actors has adopted a norm, the norm has reached its “tipping point”, 
and will thereafter become internalised. At this point, the norm has been so widely 
accepted, that it acquires a “taken-for-granted” quality and is no longer a matter of 
public debate. When a norm is fully internalised,  conformity  with the norm 
comes almost automatic, and it can even be hard to discern the norm, as most 
people don’t  reflect over it anymore. Examples of fully  discerned norms (at least 
in Western societies) are market exchange, sovereignty, and individualism (Ibid: 
895, 904). Or, as Finnemore & Sikkink states, “few people today  discuss whether 
women should be allowed to vote, whether slavery is useful, or whether medical 
personnel should be granted immunity during war” (Ibid: 895). This study 
concentrates on the second stage in the norm life cycle, the norm cascade, where 
the characteristic mechanism is socialisation. 
2.1.3 Socialisation
In his work on the socialising potential of international institutions, Jeffrey 
Checkel defines socialisation as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and 
rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the 
internalisation of these new norms” (Checkel 2005: 804). During the socialisation 
process, the actor switches from following a logic of consequences, to a logic of 
appropriateness. However, Checkel argues, agents may follow a logic of 
appropriateness in more than one way. Checkel therefore distinguishes between 
Type I internalisation and Type II internalisation. In Type I internalisation, agents 
simply  act in accordance with what is expected of them by  others. They adopt a 
role, regardless if they agree with the role or not. “The key is the agents knowing 
what is socially  accepted in a given setting or community” (Ibid: 804). In Type II 
internalisation, on the other hand, the interests and values of the agent changes. 
Community norms are accepted as “the right  thing to do”, and the values and 
sometimes also the identity  of the community are adopted by the agent (Ibid: 
804). 
To summarise, socialisation is a process, with the end goal of internalisation. 
This process can occur through different mechanisms. Two examples of such 
mechanisms are external incentives and social learning. External incentives theory 
and social learning are not the only  models of norm diffusion and 
Europeanisation, but they are models who have been explicitly adapted to the 
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Eastern enlargement, particularly regarding liberal democratic norms, and are 
therefore suitable for this analysis (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 230).
2.2 External Incentives Theory
One of the major approaches in the field of EU enlargement studies regarding the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries’ adaption into the EU norms and 
rules is the “external incentives model”. In this model, it  is argued that the rule 
adaption of the CEE candidate countries was mainly driven by the reward of EU 
membership, promised by the EU as an external actor (Falkner & Treib 2008: 
294). As adopting norms are politically and economically  costly for a state, 
external incentives, such as EU conditionality, has been considered the most 
effective mechanism (O'Dwyer 2010: 229). 
Frank Schimmelfennig, one of the major scholars on Europeanisation in the 
CEE countries, argues that “only  the credible conditional promise of membership 
in the EU (and NATO) has the potential to produce compliance with liberal-
democratic norms in norm-violating transformation countries” (Schimmelfennig 
2007: 126). By comparing the CEE countries with other states from the former 
Soviet bloc, Schimmelfennig argues that  the democracy  promotion by European 
regional organisations has been effective in producing durable democratic change. 
Political conditionality is used by  international organisations to induce political 
change at the state level. In the CEE countries, the adoption of liberal-democratic 
norms became the condition for receiving a reward from the Western community. 
With few exceptions, political conditionality  in Europe has been strictly rewards-
based. Transitional states has not been coerced into changing their systems, but 
the reward – the inclusion in the Western community – has been withheld if the 
states have not complied (Ibid: 127).  
According to the external incentives theory, the adoption of EU norms of 
democracy  and human rights depends on “the size and credibility of tangible, 
material incentives provided by  external actors as well as on the political costs 
that target governments occur when adopting and implementing these rules 
domestically”  (Schimmelfennig 2007: 128; Cirtautas & Schimmelfennig 2010: 
424). The size of the reward must be bigger than the domestic costs of imposing 
the norm. Most importantly, the target government must be certain that the reward 
will be paid if the conditions are met. Regarding the size of the reward, 
Schimmelfennig argues that only the material benefits of NATO and the EU has 
tangible material benefits to offer. The Council of Europe can provide 
international recognition, but fails to offer any direct material gains. Adopting 
norms of democracy  and human rights means losses in influence and power 
among ruling elites, who now face competition from independent courts, political 
opposition and free media. Only the external gains of, above all, EU membership 
can compensate for this, through inter alia access to the internal market, and 
possibilities of financial subsidies (Schimmelfennig 2007: 128f). Thus, it is 
primarily  the prospect  of EU membership that motivates candidate governments. 
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The impact that the prospect of membership has on the domestic politics, depends 
on the preferences of national parties, and the number of veto players on the 
domestic arena. 
If EU membership is the single most important factor in CEE compliance of 
EU norms, one would expect compliance to weaken after EU membership is 
obtained, as there is thus no longer any strong external incentives for compliance. 
Then how can external incentives be perceived as being a method for true 
democratic consolidation? According to social constructivist theories, the 
rationale behind using conditionality for imposing certain rules and norms on 
states lies in the perception that “legal rules and norms operate by  changing 
interests and thus reshaping the purposes for which power is exercised” (Jordan 
2003: 664). Norms and rules shape and constrain states in their decision-making, 
by obliging them to observe the norms. By taking part in the process of norm-
creation, state actors begin to think that complying with the norm is in their own 
self-interest (Ibid: 664). Scholars of social constructivism sometimes also 
acknowledge that the process of norm conformity may be partially  explained by 
other theoretical approaches, such as neoliberalism. According to this logic, states 
choose to conform to a certain norm, when they believe that it  will facilitate 
cooperation and minimise transaction costs, or maximise utility. The reason for 
conforming to inter alia a human rights norm, is thus not primarily because the 
state believe in the values of the norm, but because it believes that it  will gain 
advantages in forms of inter alia international prestige or improved trade 
conditions – a so called instrumental adoption of the norm. However, these two 
logics can be combined. Even if a state adopts a set of norms on instrumental 
grounds, if this adoption leads to a domestic structural change (such as increased 
democratisation), this spills over into a process of identity  transformation. Thus, 
norms that are initially adopted for instrumental reasons, are later maintained 
because they have become a part of the state's belief and identity (Ibid: 665f). In 
other words, after “imposing” the norms through conditionality, the states begin to 
believe that it is in their own self-interest, for many reasons, to follow the norm. 
One of the main concerns in the period around the 2005 EU enlargement was that 
the norm compliance of the new members would decrease after membership was 
obtained (O'Dwyer 2010: 229). In the EU case, the high-intensity involvement of 
the Commission during the accession process was believed to create a 
momentum, where the states themselves would want to follow the EU norms even 
after becoming members, i.e. when the external incentive was no longer present 
(Sasse 2008: 842).
2.3 Social Learning
The theories of social learning posits that durable conformity to the norm occurs 
when states are persuaded by the appropriateness of the norm. In the EU case, 
Europeanisation follows when a member or candidate state are convinced of the 
suitability of the EU norms, and the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors 
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thereby are altered. Unlike external incentives theory, which proscribes that states 
choose to proscribe to a norm in order to reap  a reward, the states are here 
changing their beliefs and preferences (O'Dwyer 2010: 230, 232). Checkel, using 
different terminology, calls this normative suasion. “When normative suasion 
takes place, agents actively and reflectively  internalise new understandings of 
appropriateness. If asked about the source of compliance, agents - after conscious 
thought - might answer, ’Well, this is the right thing to do even though I didn’t 
used to think so.’” (Checkel 2005: 812). Here, we see a clear switch to a logic of 
consequences, thus resulting in Type II internalisation. 
     This persuasion of the suitability of a norm often comes through the activity of 
transnational networks of actors, as well as from international organisations, who 
puts pressure on domestic governments to endorse European norms in the 
domestic political discourse. Such persuasion is easiest where the EU norms 
“resonate” with domestic norms, i.e. when the new norm is not in direct 
opposition to previous, dominant norms (O’Dwyer 2010: 232f; Checkel 2005: 
813). Given the controversy  surrounding issues of LGBT rights in many  member 
states, social learning should be expected to be harder in this policy  area than in 
many others. 
As the name implies, this mechanism emphasises learning. Agents are 
expected to update and alter their believes and practices in the light of new 
information. There is thus a focus on deliberative processes, where agents are 
open to be persuaded by  “the better argument”. The EU can foster social learning 
by developing and supporting transnational networks that include domestic, as 
well as European actors. This would also have the benefit of increasing the 
perception of “norm ownership”, that the norm is not considered as imposed and 
foreign. The networks can also be used to channel financial support. Although 
networks are often self-generating, the EU can play a significant role in 
facilitating their existence (O’Dwyer 2010: 233). Effective social learning will 
thus require organised domestic advocacy  networks that are robust enough to 
represent the issue and lobby the national governments. The EU institutions can 
assist in supporting these networks, not least financially. Indications of social 
learning, is when transformative public deliberations are taking place on the issue. 
In the present case, when LGBT rights become a salient political issue, on which 
political parties differentiate themselves: “[i]f an issue is not salient in party 
competition, it constitutes part of the assumed status quo, or the ‘regime of 
silence’” (Ibid: 233f). 
Conor O’Dwyer and Katarina Schwartz mentions environmental protection as 
an example of successful case of norm diffusion through social learning. Here, the 
EU environmental norms were promoted by a transnational epistemic network, 
and international institutions and cooperation, such as the “Environment for 
Europe” initiative, provided mechanism for social learning by fostering 
deliberation, information exchange, bureaucratic networks, and technical 
assistance (2010:235f). 
Social learning and external incentives complement each other, but during the 
accession process, emphasis has been on external incentives such as 
conditionality. Even though internalisation can become the result  of 
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conditionality, as actors may come to identify themselves with their behaviour, 
there is a considerable risk that the norm is not fully  internalised, and thus may 
not be adhered to in the absence of the external incentives. In my analysis, I will 
use these theoretical concepts, to determine whether one can find examples of the 
EU employing these mechanisms in its work for the rights of sexual minorities.
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3 LGBT Rights as an EU Norm 
Before analysing what mechanisms the EU has at its disposal for socialising its 
members states to the norm of LGBT equality, it  must first be established what 
these norms are and how they are expressed. In the following chapter, I first give a 
brief introduction to the normative foundation of the EU. The aim is to show in 
what ways the EU can be viewed a “community  of values”, where the founding 
principles and values of the Union play a large role for its self-perception. I then 
move on to illustrate in what ways one can claim that the EU has a strong norm on 
non-discrimination towards sexual minorities. I argue that these norms are 
manifested in EU legislation, as well as expressed politically. In the last section, I 
show that there is a discrepancy between the EU norms and the practice in some 
Member States.
3.1 The Normative Foundation of the EU
From having a traditional and nearly  exclusive focus on economic matters, the 
European Union has, in the past  20 years, increasingly taken human rights issues 
to heart. Human rights has become a central component in the EU’s work, not 
least in its foreign policy  and neighbourhood policy (Smith 2003: 12f). Some 
scholars would go as far as to claim that the EU is first and foremost a peace 
project, that the economic cooperation is to a large extent merely  a mean to 
achieve the goal of peace (Möller 2005: 11). 
Already  in Article 2 of the Treaty  on European Union (TEU), explicit 
reference is made to human rights:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.
Human rights and minority  rights, along with principles of non-discrimination and 
tolerance, are thus explicitly referred to as the founding values of the European 
Union. A further example of the importance attested to these values are the 
provisions of Article 7 of the TEU, according to which the Council, if they 
determine that there is a “serious breach by a Member State of the values referred 
to in Article 2”, may decide to suspend certain of the rights of the Member State, 
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including its voting rights in the Council. Even though such extreme measures are 
unlikely to happen, it is a powerful testament to importance of these norms. 
In 2000, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted. The Charter 
brings together in a single document the fundamental rights protected in the EU, 
to make them more visible and to anchor them in EU law. Through Article 6.1 in 
the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, the Charter 
became legally binding in the EU. The Charter is to ensure that  the fundamental 
rights are protected in the implementation of EU law (European Commission 
2013b).
The EU has also put an emphasis on its norms and values regarding human 
rights in its external relations.  In Article 3.5 of the TEU, it is stated that “[i]n its 
relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests”, and contribute to, among other things, peace, security  and the 
promotion of human rights (European Union 2010b). The EU can thus be 
regarded as a value-based community, with a distinct normative dimension. Its 
identity is largely based upon these “European” values (Mos 2013: 81). 
3.2 LGBT Rights in the EU
3.2.1 Legislation
The EU took its first  concrete measures for a LGBT policy with the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Before that, tentative attempts had been made to discuss the issue. The 
European Parliament had during the 1980’s adopted two non-binding resolutions 
that highlighted the issue1, but no policy proposals had been put forward.  A major 
shift occurred with the so called Roth Report in 19942, which has been described 
as a cornerstone in the Parliament’s work on LGBT rights. The Roth Report 
brought up the issues of wide-spread sexual orientation discrimination in the areas 
of employment, marriage, adoption, and privacy. Following the report, the 
European Parliament called upon the European Commission to draft anti-
discrimination recommendations for sexual orientation3. At a minimum, such 
recommendations should seek to end different and discriminatory ages of consent 
for homosexual and heterosexual acts, all forms of discrimination in labor law, the 
barring of gay  and lesbian couples from marriage (or equivalent  legal framework) 
1 Resolution by Parliament on sexual discrimination at the workplace (Official Journal No C 104 
of 16 April 1984;  Resolution by Parliament on discrimination against transsexuals (Official 
Journal No. C 256 of 9 October 1989)
2 Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties & Internal Affairs on Equal Rights for Homosexuals 
& Lesbians in the European Community (EUR. PARL. DOC., A3-0028/94)
3 Resolution by Parliament on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC (Official 
Journal No. C 061 of 28 February 1994)
17
and to have children. At the same time, a number of minority groups had started to 
lobby the EU Member States to eradicate discrimination on various grounds. In 
the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999, the Member States 
addressed the issue. Article 134 of the Treaty now allowed for the EU to adopt 
legislation banning all forms of discrimination, including sexual orientation 
(Langenkamp 2003: 440ff). Up  until this point, there was no legal protection at 
the EU level from discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Rather, two 
decisions from the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) (Grant v. South-
West Trains Ltd. and D. v. Council of the European Union) had demonstrated the 
need to protect the rights of LGBT people. The decisions determined, inter alia, 
that under current Community law, negative treatment of homosexuals did not 
constitute gender discrimination, as long as both male and female homosexuals 
were treated equally (Ibid: 442f).
Two landmark anti-discrimination Directives were shortly after adopted on the 
basis of these new treaty provisions: the Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) 
and the Framework Employment Directive (2000/78/EC). The Framework 
Employment Directive prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the grounds 
of disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief, and age. It is however much 
narrower in scope than the Race Equality Directive, which obliges Member States 
to adopt anti-discrimination legislation in the areas of employment, education, 
social protection including social security and healthcare, and access to and the 
supply of goods and services, including housing. This effectively  mean that  there 
is no EU legislation protecting LGBT people from discrimination such as 
impossibility  to visit partners in hospitals, paying higher premiums on health 
insurance, being denied social benefits reserved for married couples, or being 
refused to rent, to name a few (Bakowski 2010: 2f). Even though this legislation 
is narrow in scope, it is important to note that it nevertheless the only international 
legislation prohibiting discrimination in the grounds of sexual orientation 
(Swiebel 2009: 23). This in itself serves as a demonstration of the norm.
Important to note is that transgender persons are (for obvious reasons) not 
covered under the discrimination ground “sexual orientation”. Discrimination 
against transgender persons is instead prohibited under the so called “Recast 
Directive” (2006/54/EC), adopted in 2006, which is aimed at consolidating the 
previous existing EU provisions on equal treatment between men and women. In 
the Directive an explicit reference to discrimination based on “gender 
reassignment” was introduced for the first time in EU law (European Parliament 
2010: 4).
When the Charter became legally binding it further emphasised the norm of 
non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, as Article 21.1 of the 
Charter states that:
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation 
shall be prohibited.
(European Union, 2010a)
4 Now Article 19 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
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The Lisbon Treaty also put the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU). Beyond obliging the EU to ensure that all EU 
legislation conforms with the Charter, it  puts an obligation on the EU to actively 
mainstream equality in its work and activities (Leigh et al. 2012: 13).
3.2.2 Political Norms
The EU thus have some competence to act on LGBT issues, although the 
legislation is currently  not comprehensive.  Beyond the legally codified norms of 
non-discrimination towards sexual minorities (which are limited in its 
application), I argue that there is also a clear political norm on LGBT rights. 
This norms expresses itself, inter alia, by the public support from EU 
institutions and politicians. The European Parliament has become a principal 
driving force in bringing LGBT rights onto the political agenda. Although the 
Parliament is arguably the weakest among the major institutions in terms of 
political power, they play  a significant role in raising awareness of issues and 
influencing legislation by  drafting amendments to Commission proposals. The 
Parliament drafts a substantial amount of reports and resolutions. Although these 
resolutions are non-binding, they serve as important tools in the EU’s political 
context (ILGA-Europe 2013a). Examples of resolutions and reports from the 
Parliament includes support for mutual recognition of same-sex partnerships 
between EU Member States (European Parliament 2009a), a call for a 
comprehensive anti-discrimination Directive (European Parliament 2008), and a 
call for the revision of a homophobic law in Lithuania (European Parliament 
2009b). 
Viviane Reding, Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship, has on several occasions voiced her support for LGBT rights and 
stressed “the importance of pursuing a determined effort in fighting against 
homophobia and in promoting equality for LGBT people”, because homophobia 
is an “unacceptable violation of human dignity”  and it is incompatible with the 
founding values of the EU (Reding 2010). 
The EU’s commitment to LGBT rights is also evident not least in its external 
policies. Protecting and promoting the rights of LGBT people is one of the EU’s 
priorities in their foreign policy. Through the “European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights” (EIDHR), adopted in 2007, the EU channels 
financial and organisational support to local NGO’s. Within EIDHR the EU 
promotes, inter alia, non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (EEAS 
2013). 
In 2010, the Council’s working party  on human rights adopted a “LGBT 
Toolkit” which lists priorities and recommendations for addressing the human 
rights of LGBT people. The toolkit aims to “help the EU institutions, EU Member 
State capitals, EU Delegations, Representations and Embassies to react 
proactively to violations of the human rights of LGBT people, and to address 
structural causes behind these violations” by outlining operational tools for raising 
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issues of persecution, discrimination and ill-treatment of LGBT people, in 
dialogues with third country representatives (Council of the European Union 
2010: 1). Even though the toolkit  is not legally binding for the Member States, it 
draws it legitimacy from the TEU, and illustrates a larger commitment of the EU 
towards LGBT equality.
In addition to this, High Representative Catherine Ashton, as well as other 
high-ranking EU diplomats, are frequently  speaking out on issues of LGBT rights 
in third countries: 
The EU campaigns tirelessly for the respect of human rights, irrespective of sexual 
orientation and gender identity. We raise the issue of LGBTI rights during our Human 
Rights dialogues, we speak out through public statements, and we work behind the 
scenes with our Delegations to argue the case for justice and human rights. 
(Ashton 2013)
In conclusion, I have argued that the EU has a clear norm of non-discrimination of 
LGBT people, and that this norm is being expressed not only in EU legislation, 
but also through political measures, such as public statements and proposals. 
These statements often make an effort to frame LGBT rights as being integral to 
EU’s fundamental values, such as non-discrimination, equality, and freedom of 
assembly.
3.3 Discrepancy Within the EU
In the fore-math of the Eastern enlargement, concerns were expressed that the 
new Member States would not  comply  with the EU acquis after accession, when 
the forceful compliance mechanism of membership was no longer present. Even 
though this fear has widely  been considered to have been overstated on most 
policy areas (Tallberg et al 2009: 125), there is reason to reflect on how the norm 
of LGBT equality has been internalised in some of the new member states. I will 
in this section argue that there are large discrepancies within the EU in the 
protection and rights for LGBT people. 
It can be questioned whether the norm of LGBT equality has been fully 
internalised even in the core EU countries, not  least since it is a culturally 
sensitive norm. A recent  study from the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) on the situation for LGBT people in the EU, with more than 93 000 
respondents, concluded that discrimination against LGBT people took place in all 
EU Member States. Nearly half of the respondents, which all identified 
themselves as LGBT, reported they had felt personally discriminated against  or 
harassed due to their sexual orientation in the last year. A quarter had experienced 
violence in the last five years (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
2013a: 7). 
However, even if discrimination against LGBT people occur all over the EU, a 
World Values Survey from 2005/2006 indicates that homophobia is more 
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widespread in the eastern Member States. In the survey 54,5 % of the respondents 
in Latvia, 55,2 % in Poland, and 67,5 % in Lithuania responded that they  would 
not want a homosexual neighbour. In the EU-155, the corresponding number was 
18,8 %, with the highest numbers being 25-28 %. Further, 76,9 % of respondents 
in Latvia, 59,9 % in Poland, and 78 % in Lithuania considered homosexuality to 
never be justifiable. In the EU-15, only an average of 23 % agreed with this 
statement, with the highest numbers being 35-40 % (World Values Survey 2009). 
These surveys shows that there are significant  differences between old and new 
Member States in the attitudes towards sexual minorities.
Public perceptions of homosexuality gives an indication of whether the norm 
has been internalised or not. At the same time, one might wonder what differs 
some of the eastern Member States to some of the “old”, western states? If public 
perception is the main indicator of internalisation of the norm, where do one draw 
the line? How many percentage of the population must be homophobic for the 
state to be considered homophobic? In May 2013, major demonstrations took 
place in France against a new law legalising same-sex marriages. The large 
demonstrations illustrated that there is still far from unity  on the issue of LGBT 
rights, and that there are still opposition to LGBT equality  from different  groups 
in society. With this backdrop, what differs France from, inter alia, Poland or 
Latvia? 
Even if discrimination against LGBT people and homophobia occur all over 
EU, one factor stands out in some eastern states: the level of state-sponsored 
homophobia. In the FRA survey, a demarkation line could be seen along east/west 
lines in the answer to the question “how widespread is offensive language about 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgendered people by politicians where you 
live?”. In the western countries, generally  fewer than 10 % answered “very 
widespread”, whereas in the eastern states, 30-40 % of respondents gave the same 
answer (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013b).
In several eastern Member States, Pride parades have been denied permission. 
The bans are often motivated by references to participant and public safety, the 
violation of public morals, and the preservation of public morals. This was the 
case in 2008 in Lithuania, and the year after in Latvia (European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights 2010: 31). 
The European Parliament has in a number of resolutions expressed concern 
over the increase in homophobia in the eastern Member States. In a resolution 
from May 2012, the Parliament regrets that “in the EU, the fundamental rights of 
LGBT people are not always fully upheld” (European Parliament  2012: para 1). 
The resolution explicitly singled out Hungary, Lithuania, and Latvia. In 2009, the 
Parliament adopted a resolution that declared that  a Lithuanian law was in breach 
of EU and international human rights obligations, as it would forbid co called 
“propaganda” of homosexual relations to minors (European Parliament 2009).
In his study on post-accession Poland and Latvia, O’Dwyer concludes that 
both states have a very high rate of “state-sponsored homophobia”, where 
5 The Member States prior to the 2004 enlargement: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.
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politicians are using a homophobic language, and harassment are day-to-day 
occurring for LGBT people who are open about their sexuality (O’Dwyer 2010: 
234f, 238ff). As mentioned before, it is hard to measure whether a norm has been 
internalised, and neither is this the purpose of this study. However, the examples 
given in this section are used as illustrative examples of how the norm norm of 
non-discrimination and equality  for sexual minorities has not yet been internalised 
in all Member States. In other words, rather than showing what would indicate 
successful norm internalisation, I suffice with claiming that if the norm was 
internalised, we would not find evidence of abrogation of civil liberties, firing of 
public officials, introduction of homophobic legislation and aggressively 
homophobic statements by officials in high public office (O’Dwyer & Schwartz 
2010: 231f). 
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4 From Conditionality to Social 
Learning?
So far I have shown that there is a discrepancy between the EU norm of non-
discrimination towards sexual minorities, and the practice in some Member 
States, where the norm has not yet been fully  internalised. This raises the question 
whether the EU’s compliance system can compensate for for the absence of 
conditional incentives, i.e. the threat of withholding membership during the 
accession period. What happens in the areas of political conditionality, such as 
human rights and minority  protection, where the EU institutions’ powers vis-à-vis 
the Member States are limited? In the following chapter, I analyse how the EU is 
addressing this problem. What tools do they have at their disposal? How do they 
work on issues of LGBT rights? More specifically, I seek to investigate whether 
the EU has replaced conditionality with other socialisation mechanisms, such as 
social learning.
First, it is important to clarify that it is hard to look at the EU as a unified actor 
on these issues. Rather, one has to look at the different EU institutions separately, 
as they have different competence to act, and different tools at their disposal. I 
will therefore analyse their actions separately. I will focus my  analysis on the 
Commission and the European Parliament, as they are the main supranational 
institutions. I will also briefly account for the FRA’s work on LGBT rights. The 
Council naturally has a lot of power to act, not least in the legislative field, but as 
an intergovernmental institution, it has its limits. The very Member States who do 
not wish to increase these rights sit in the Council, and may block any such 
proposals. Further, as the focus of this study is to look at what socialisation 
mechanisms the EU has at its disposal, it is more fruitful to look at the two 
supranational institutions, as they have more mechanisms at their disposal. 
4.1 The European Commission
As the core executive institution in the EU, and the one with the largest resources 
at their disposal, the Commission has a large role to play in socialising Member 
States into following the norms. Often referred to as the “driver of integration”, 
the Commission has an institutional interest in furthering EU integration and 
propose new legislation. The Commission is also the “guardian of the treaties” 
and has the power to initiate infringement procedures against a Member State, if 
they  are not complying with EU law (Hix & Høyland 2011: 35ff). The 
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Commission has used this power in relation to LGBT rights. In one case, the 
Polish authorities refused to issue certificates on civil status to citizens who 
wished to marry or register partnership  with a person of the same sex in another 
Member State. The Commission here intervened with the Polish authorities on the 
basis that this practice was incompatible with the Article 7 of the Charter, respect 
for private life, Article 21, non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, and the EU rules on free movement. The intervention resulted in the 
Polish authorities taking steps to change their regulations (European Commission 
2012: 52). Another case involved the Czech authorities using a so-called 
“phallometric test” to test the validity of asylum seekers claims of their sexual 
orientation. The Commission claimed that this was a clear violation of Articles 4 
and 7 of the Charter, as it was to be regarded as degrading treatment and not 
respecting the private life. This was particularly so, according to the Commission, 
for people who have been persecuted due to their sexual orientation (Ibid: 52f). 
In 2008 the Commission proposed a new anti-discrimination Directive (the so-
called Horizontal Directive), that would prohibit  discrimination based on religion 
or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation also on areas outside of 
employment. Effectively, these groups would enjoy  the same protection offered in 
the Race Directive. The proposal never made it through the negotiations in the 
Council however, and to date, five years later, there are few expectations of it to 
be adopted in the near future (Leigh et al 2012: 22f). Even though the main 
countries blocking the proposal (Germany, Czech Republic, Italy, Lithuania and 
Malta) had conservative governments, the objections has been less based on 
Christian mores on sexual orientation, and more on the costs relating to installing 
disabled access to buildings, as well as on legal uncertainty  on subsidiarity  and 
proportionality (Euobserver 101006).
These measures taken by the Commission has less to do with social learning 
than on mechanisms of strategic calculation. There has been no shift to a logic of 
appropriateness, rather the Member States in question has made a calculated 
choice to comply  with the Commission’s objections. However, legislation can 
play  an important role, even in terms of socialisation. Once legislation is in place, 
actors will have to start to act according to it, whether they agree with the logic 
behind it or not. They “play  a role”, because they are expected to do so. And after 
a while, their identity  may come to be shaped after their behaviour, and ultimately, 
there had been a shift of preference (Checkel 2005: 810f). Naturally, this is not 
always the case, neither is full internalisation always achieved. But it is not 
uncommon that legislation drives the normative development, not least regarding 
society as a whole.
Another aspect of the proposed Directive was that it would oblige 
governments to encourage dialogue with non-governmental organisations 
(NGO’s) working in the field. Before proposing new legislation to implement the 
Directive, the governments would have to consult  LGBT interest groups. Thus, 
they  would have to, at least implicitly, recognise LGBT groups as legitimate 
partners (Swiebel 2009: 25).
One major way that the Commission facilitates social learning is through its 
funding of NGO’s. Through its action programme to combat discrimination, the 
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PROGRESS Community Programme the EU seeks to develop the capacity  of key 
players, such as local authorities, social partners and NGO’s. To achieve this, it  is 
encouraging exchanges of information and good practices, and establishing 
European networks. The programme is also intended to “promote and disseminate 
the values and practices that underpin the fight against discrimination” (European 
Commission 2013c). By encouraging transnational networks, and facilitating 
deliberation, this method should have good prospects of achieving social learning. 
By strengthening civil society  in the Member States where the LGBT norm has 
weak resonance, there is higher probability that they will be able to persuade state 
elites on the appropriateness of the norm. The thinking behind the programme is 
that legislation, albeit  important, is not in itself enough to combat discrimination, 
as one need to alter one’s behaviour and perceptions of what behaviour that is 
deemed appropriate. By making money available for fact-finding and research, 
the outcomes generated by  the activities, may also in the end result in new 
legislative measures, but then based on altered expectations. According to the 
Commission, a key aim of the EU's work on combating discrimination is to 
“foster dialogue and strengthen networking between organisations” (European 
Commission 2013d). This is facilitated by the Commission’s bi-annual meetings, 
where NGO’s are invited to discuss current Community  matters, inter alia, 
legislative and policy proposals, and give input. 
Under the PROGRESS programme, the EU also funds European umbrella 
NGO networks, among them ILGA-Europe. ILGA-Europe is the largest LGBT 
advocacy group  in Europe, and provides assistance to local LGBT groups, as well 
as lobby the European institutions on issues of LGBT rights. ILGA-Europe 
receives most of its fundings from the Commission:
Financial support received by the different funders for staff costs is indispensable as it is 
the staff of ILGA-Europe who has the expertise to provide capacity-building across 
Europe, to implement projects and to support different actors involved in promoting 
equality and combating non-discrimination.
(ILGA-Europe 2013)
Apart from strengthening the NGO’s, PROGRESS is also intended to support 
national authorities in “developing their national policy to combat discrimination 
and promote equality beyond legislation” and identifying best practices which can 
be used by other participating countries (Ibid). NGO’s are considered to be a 
valuable asset in both formulating and implementing policy - through the 
information and expertise supplied by their members. Thus, the programme is 
aimed at creating a deliberative environment, where agents can be persuaded into 
the belief that LGBT rights are in fact human rights - core EU norms.
4.2 The European Parliament
As described in section 2.2, the European Parliament is in many ways the most 
progressive EU institution when it comes to LGBT rights and has played a large 
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part in bringing LGBT rights onto the political agenda. The Parliament’s main 
power lies in raising awareness of issues and influencing legislation by making 
amendments to, and approving, Commission proposals. The Parliament also drafts 
a substantial amount of reports and resolutions on various subjects (ILGA-Europe 
2013a). The Parliament has on a number of occasions spoken out on LGBT 
rights., both on specific matters, such as the call for the revision of the 
homophobic law in Lithuania, and on more general matters. In May 2012, the 
Parliament adopted a resolution on the fight of homophobia in Europe. The 
resolution won overwhelming support in the Parliament, with 403 votes in favour 
of the resolution, and only  105 against. The resolution calls for the adoption of the 
Horizontal Directive, adoption of legislation against homophobic and transphobic 
violence and crimes, and a “roadmap” for equality  on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and gender equality (European Parliament Intergroup on LGBT Rights 
2012). Such a roadmap  would establish a coherent and overarching plan of action 
in the area of LGBT rights and provide transparency regarding the work the EU 
has already done for LGBT rights. It  could further be an effective means of 
developing clear, long-term goals, and the process to achieve these goals; co-
ordinating positions and ensuring a coherent approach; and drawing together 
diverse issues in a single document and effectively communicating those issues 
(Leigh et al 2012: 8, 10).
The European Parliament thus play  an important role in acknowledging the 
issue and pushing the development of the EU norm. It also have an important role 
in pointing out Member States when they  are not following the norm (“shaming” 
them). This form of incentive-based mechanism is in itself not a socialisation 
mechanism. If Member States only alter their behaviour because they are told to 
do so, and to avoid being regarded as different from others, no real change of the 
state’s preferences and beliefs have occurred. As pointed out before, however, this 
can be a start of a socialisation process, as the actor will later start to alter its 
beliefs after its behaviour. Some authors argue that peer pressure from the 
European Parliament has had a large impact in some policy areas, such as on 
minority rights in the Baltic states. In these states, what started as strategic adn 
instrumental processes, over time led to changing practices and sustained 
compliance, which are patterns of deeper socialisation effects (Checkel 2005: 814; 
Sedelmeier 2011: 28).
4.3 The European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights
The European Union Agency  for Fundamental Rights (FRA) is an EU specialised 
agency, with the objective to provide the EU institutions and Member States with 
independent, evidence-based advice on fundamental rights. FRA was created in 
2007 by  Council Regulation EC 168/2007, and has the aim to contribute towards 
ensuring full respect for fundamental rights across the EU (European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013c).
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One of FRA’s main tasks is to collect objective, reliable and comparable 
information and data on fundamental rights issues across the EU. The research is 
mainly done on particular themes, rather than monitoring or assessing individual 
Member States (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013d). In the 
area of LGBT rights, the FRA has produced a number of reports. In 2008 and 
2009, it published reports on the legal and social situation regarding homophobia 
and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in the 
Member States, with updates in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, it released a report on 
hate crimes in the EU. In 2013, the results of a large survey  on the fulfilment and 
protection of LGBT rights in the EU, ordered by the Commission, was published 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013e). The data collected is 
used to provide assistance and expertise to the EU institutions and Member States 
to support them to fully respect the fundamental rights. In addition, the FRA also 
collects and shares “promising practices”  among the EU Member States. This 
gives Member States the opportunity to learn from successful models from each 
other (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013f).
 The work done by the FRA is a good starting point for actions that can be 
taken by the EU on LGBT issues. By providing data about the situation for 
LGBT rights in the Union, and how this relates to the fundamental rights, the 
Member States has an opportunity  to learn, and to improve on LGBT rights. The 
data becomes the starting point from which politicians can act. It is likely  to 
facilitate social learning, as the reports make visible the problems and provides 
arguments for why LGBT rights are important. As Kelly  Kollman has shown in 
her study on same-sex unions policy, “Europe has had a far greater impact on 
national policy outcomes when its influence has been felt through the informal 
processes of norm diffusion and elite socialization than when it  has tried to 
impose formal mandates through court decisions and EU directives.”  The article 
argues that “the EU, the ECtHR, and a transnational network of LGBT activists 
have played a crucial role in this policy change by creating a soft law norm for 
relationship  recognition and disseminating this norm to policymakers in Western 
European states” (Kollman 2009: 37). By framing the norm of LGBT equality as a 
matter of rights, and not morality, the issue can be connected to the universal, and 
“unobjectionable” norms of human rights. This in turn increases the possibility for 
successful deliberation and social learning.
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5 Concluding Discussion
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the EU works actively on promoting its 
norms of non-discrimination towards sexual minorities towards its members 
states. The normative development of the issue is credited mainly  to the European 
Parliament, who keeps the issue a part of the political debate, even at times when 
the political will among the other institutions is lagging. Even if the parliamentary 
resolutions are non-binding on the Member States, they provide a normative 
direction, and in the case of LGBT rights, it  has usually been the Parliament that 
has driven the expansion of rights in the Union. The strong focus on LGBT rights 
in the external policies are also contributing to securing the norm as a part of the 
EU’s founding values - something it wishes to export to the rest of the world. 
Some of the mechanisms the EU employs has more strands of strategic 
calculation than others, such as when the Parliament expresses concerns over the 
development in specific Member States. The Commission intervening when 
Members States are not complying with EU law is another example. But these 
actions may still be part  of a socialisation process, even if it is not through a social 
learning process. Further, in pointing out unacceptable behaviour, Member States 
learn more of the values the EU wishes to promote, which could lead to 
internalisation of those values in the longer run. 
In recent years, some changes has been seen in, inter alia, Poland. The current 
government has taken a more liberal stand towards LGBT right than the previous 
one, which may be attributed to socialisation. Among other things, legislation on 
same-sex partnerships has been proposed (Polskie Radio, 130305). Still there is a 
large scepticism towards sexual minorities in Poland, but the fact that government 
is taken a more progressive stand than the general public, suggests that there may 
have been some elite socialisation by the EU. It is however hard to determine 
whether there is a causal relationship between EU actions of social learning and 
these developments. In order to make such conclusions, in-depth interviews with 
national policy-makers and representatives from civil society are needed. Even if 
no definite conclusions can be made in this study regarding the internalisation of 
the norm in EU Member States, the fact that the political elites - that are leaders of 
normative development - is explicitly  not adhering to the norm, indicates that one 
has not yet reached internalisation. 
Progress has been made in the past decade, but more can, and needs to, be 
done to harmonise the protection of the rights of LGBT people across the Union. 
It is important to adopt the Horizontal Directive. Apart from securing protection 
from discrimination outside of the area of employment, it  would send an 
important message that there is not any hierarchy among groups, that some groups 
are not deserving of more protection than others. Further, with legislation in place, 
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Member States would have something concrete to work around, something that 
would increase the possibility of eventually internalising the norm.
One major challenge for the EU is to create the political will for dealing with 
LGBT issues among national politicians. Some social learning will most likely be 
fostered by the mere construction of the EU itself. As national politicians travel 
more, they are confronted with questions and remarks from their peers in other 
Member States. Further, when members of the European Parliament (MEP’s) 
interact with their counterparts in the European parties, in an environment of 
“European” values, one would expect that they learn to see the value of sexual 
minority  rights, especially  when these norms are framed in relation to 
“unobjectionable” EU norms, such as human rights and minority protection. 
When these politicians return to the Member States, they are likely to bring some 
of these new values into the national politics. But to accelerate the transformative 
process, the EU should engage more actively  in social learning mechanisms. One 
way of reaching this result  would be to create a framework for LGBT issues 
within the Union. Increased coordination, between and within the European 
institutions, would facilitate the development of a coherent and long term plan of 
action, as has been done in other policy areas (such as environmental policy). 
With clear objectives, such as awareness-raising, and knowing how and when to 
bring up these issues with national governments, the socialisation effects would 
most likely be increased. With such a plan in place, the EU could also develop 
indicators to assess whether certain objectives have been met or not, as well as 
monitoring the achievements of the objectives. Considering that the EU works in 
similar ways in its external policies and in the enlargement process, this could 
likely be achieved also within the Union. 
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